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an intellectual rubric and a tool for political intervention must 
be supplemented – if not complicated – by a notion of (queer) 
assemblage, I have been often asked to elaborate on the political 
possibilities of assemblages. A prominent concept in the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the political applicability of 
assemblages appear less time-tested – as if intersectionality holds fast 
as a successful model of political transformation. Intersectionality is 
thought by many feminists to be the primary rubric for theorizing 
difference for the past two decades, and is now a prevalent approach 
in some strands of queer theory (increasingly known as “queer of 
color critique”). Intersectionality and assemblage are not analogous 
in terms of content, intent, nor utility, but they have at times 
been produced as somehow incompatible or even oppositional. 
While, as analytics, they may not be reconcilable they need not be 
oppositional, but rather frictional. In what follows, I offer some 
preliminary thoughts on the limits and possibilities of each and what 
might be gained by thinking them through and with each other. What 
are the strengths of each in the realms of theory, politics, organizing, 
legal structures, and method? Through the mapping of these two 
bifurcated genealogies, I offer some thoughts on the politics of 
feminist knowledge production – which has been driven, sometimes 
single-mindedly, by the mandate of intersectional analysis – to see 
what kinds of futures are possible for feminist theorizing.
 
INTERSECTIONALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
It has been more than 20 years since Kimberlé Crenshaw wrote 
her groundbreaking piece titled, “Demarginalizing the Intersection 
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics”[2] which, along 
with her 1991 piece “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,”[3] went 
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on to become seminal texts for the theorization of intersectionality. 
An activist and theoretical discourse about “difference” developed 
over many years by black feminists in the U.S. such as Audre 
Lorde and The Combahee River Collective, intersectionality 
became solidified as a feminist heuristic by Crenshaw’s analysis 
of anti-discrimination legal doctrine. Crenshaw mapped out three 
forms of intersectional analysis she deemed crucial: structural 
(addressing the intersection of racism and patriarchy in relation 
to battering and rape of women); political (addressing the 
intersection of anti-racist organizing and feminist organizing); and 
representational (addressing the intersection of racial stereotypes 
and gender stereotypes, particularly in the case of 2 Live Crew) 
Her intervention into mutually exclusive identity paradigms is 
one of rethinking identity politics from within, in particular, from 
within systemic legal exclusions. 
A brief survey of these and other key texts makes clear that 
intersectionality emerged from the struggles of second wave 
feminism as a crucial black feminist intervention challenging the 
hegemonic rubrics of race, class, and gender within predominantly 
white feminist frames. But, in precisely in the act of performing 
this intervention, it also produces an ironic reification of sexual 
difference as a/the foundational one that needs to be disrupted 
– that is to say, sexual and gender difference is understood as 
the constant from which there are variants. As transnational, 
postcolonial, and critical race theorists have pointed out, the 
centrality of the subject positioning of white women has been 
re-secured through the way in which intersectionality has been 
deployed. The theory of intersectionality argues that all identities 
are lived and experienced as intersectional – in such a way that 
identity categories themselves are cut through and unstable – and 
that all subjects are intersectional whether or not they recognize 
themselves as such. But what the method of intersectionality is 
374
JASBIR PUAR
meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 8 – n. 2 – p. 371-390 – jul./dez. 2013
most predominantly used to qualify is the specific “difference” 
of “women of color”, a category that has now become, I would 
argue, simultaneously emptied of specific meaning on the one 
hand and overdetermined in its deployment on the other. In this 
usage, intersectionality always produces an Other, and that Other is 
always a Woman Of Color (WOC), who must invariably be shown 
to be resistant, subversive, or articulating a grievance. And more 
pointedly, it is the difference of black women that dominates this 
genealogy of the term “women of color” (and indeed, Crenshaw is 
clear that she centralizes “black women’s experience” and posits 
“black women as the starting point”[4] of her analysis). Thus the 
consolidation of intersectionality as a dominant heuristic may 
well be driven by anxieties about maintaining the “integrity” of 
a discrete black feminist genealogy, one that does not necessarily 
resonate in terms of how intesectionality functions. For example, 
while Crenshew’s work is about reconciling what are perceived 
to be irreconcilable binary options of gender and race, Audre 
Lorde’s seminal piece “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women 
Redefining Difference”[5] from 1984 reads as a much more 
dynamic, affectively resonant postulation of lived intersectional 
subjectivities.
This ironic othering of WOC through an approach that it 
meant to alleviate such othering is exacerbated by the fact that 
intersectionality has become cathected to the field of women’s 
studies as a primary, if not singular, feminist method, and the 
paradigmatic frame through which women’s lives are understood 
and theorized, a problem reified by both WOC feminists and white 
feminists. This is despite the fact that there are wide locational 
differences in the interest in intersectionality. As someone who 
works with graduate students at Rutgers, I encounter a variety of 
uneven and vexed responses to the importance of intersectionality, 
determined in part by variations among women’s and gender 
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studies programs and geographical regions – from students who 
have are well-schooled in the lexicon of intersectionality and 
presume a taken-for-grantedness of its effects, to those who have 
yet to encounter it as a central concept. 
This claim to intersectionality as the dominant feminist 
method can be produced with such insistence that an interest in 
exploring other frames, for example assemblage, gets rendered 
as problematic and even produces WOC feminists invested in 
other genealogies as “race-traitors.” This accusation of course 
reinforces the implicit understanding that intersectionality is a 
tool to diagnose racial difference. Despite decades of feminist 
theorizing on the question of difference, difference continues to be 
“difference from”, that is, the difference from “white woman.” This 
is also then an ironic reification of racial difference as well – for 
example, Malini Joshar Schueller argues that most scholarship on 
WOC is produced by WOC, while many white feminists, although 
hailing intersectionality as primary methodological rubric continue 
to take gender difference as foundational. Much like the language 
of diversity, the language of intersectionality, its very invocation, 
it seems, largely substitutes for intersectional analysis itself. 
Further questions arise when the viability of intersectionality 
as a theoretical frame is re-situated within a changed historical and 
economic landscape of neo-liberal capitalism and identity. What 
does an intersectional critique look like – or more to the point, 
what does it do – in an age of neo-liberal pluralism, absorption 
and accommodation of difference, of all kinds of differences? If 
it is the case that intersectionality has been “mainstreamed” in the 
last two decades – a way to manage difference that colludes with 
dominant forms of liberal multiculturalism – is the qualitative force 
of the interpellation of “difference itself” altered or uncertain? 
Let me qualify that my concern is not about the formative, 
generative, and necessary intervention of Crenshaw’s work, but 
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of both the changed geopolitics of reception as well as a tendency 
towards reification in the deployment of intersectionality. Has 
intersectionality become, as Schueller argues[6], an alibi for the 
re-centering of white liberal feminists? What is a poststructuralist 
theory of intersectionality that might address multicultural and 
post-racial discourses of inclusion that destabilizes the WOC as 
a prosthetic capacity to white women? 
Such questions also bring to the fore the geopolitical 
problems of intersectional analyses. If, as Avtar Brah and Ann 
Pheonix have argued, “old debates about the category woman 
have assumed new critical urgency”[7] in the context of recent 
historical events, such as September 11th, and the occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, transnational and postcolonial scholars 
continue to point out that the categories privileged by intersectional 
analysis do not necessarily traverse national and regional 
boundaries nor genealogical exigencies, presuming and producing 
static epistemological renderings of categories themselves across 
historical and geopolitical locations. Indeed, many of the cherished 
categories of the intersectional mantra, originally starting with 
race, class, gender, now including sexuality, nation, religion, age, 
and disability, are the product of modernist colonial agendas and 
regimes of epistemic violence, operative through a western/euro-
american epistemological formation through which the whole 
notion of discrete identity has emerged, for example, in terms 
of sexuality and empire. Joseph Massad quite astutely points 
out, in his refinement of Foucauldian framings of sexuality, that 
the colonial project deployed “sexuality” as a concept that was 
largely internalized within intellectual and juridical realms but 
was not distilled as a widespread hegemonic project. So part of 
Massad’s point is that while we might worry, for example, about the 
globalization of the term queer, we deflect from the much graver 
problem of the generalization and assumed transparency of the 
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term sexuality itself – a taken for granted category of the modernist 
imperial project, not only an imposed epistemological frame, but 
also ontologically presumptuous – or in fact, an epistemological 
capture of an ontologically irreducible becoming. 
These problems are reproduced in feminist and gay and 
lesbian human rights discourses. As Nira Yuval Davis points out, 
“the analysis and methodology of intersectionality, especially 
in UN-related bodies is just emerging and often suffers from 
analytic confusions that have already been tackled by feminist 
scholars who have been working on these issues for longer…”[8]. 
To further complicate the travels of intersectional theorizing, in 
the U.S. intersectionality came from a very specific set of social 
movements, whereas in Europe, where the term is currently 
being widely taken up, the interest in intersectionality does not 
emerge from social movements. Rather, this newfound interest in 
intersectionality signals a much belated recognition of needing to 
theorize race, and also functions as a form of the field of European 
women’s studies “catching up institutionally” with U.S. women’s 
studies. For these reasons, the category “nation” appears to be the 
least theorized and acknowledged of intersectional categories, 
rendered through a form of globalizing transparency. The U.S. is 
reproduced as the dominant site of feminist inquiry through the 
use of intersectionality as a heuristic to teach difference. Thus, the 
euro-american bias of women’s studies and history of feminism 
is ironically reiterated via intersectionality, eliding the main 
intervention of transnational and postcolonial feminist scholars 
since the 1990’s, which has been, in part, about destabilizing the 
nation-centered production of the category WOC.[9] 
A final concern is that intersectionality functions as a 
problematic reinvestment in the subject, in particular, the subject 
X. Rey Chow has produced the most damning critique of what she 
calls “poststructuralist significatory incarceration”[10], seriously 
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questioning whether the marginalized subject is still a viable site 
from which to produce politics, much less whether the subject 
is a necessary precursor for politics. “Difference” produces new 
subjects of inquiry that then infinitely multiplies exclusion in 
order to promote inclusion. Difference now proceeds and defines 
identity. Part of her concern is that poststructuralist efforts to 
attend to the specificity of Others has become one, a universalizing 
project and two, always beholden to the self-referentiality of the 
“center”, ironic given that intersectionality has now come to be 
deployed as a call for and a form of anti-essentialism. [11] The 
poststructuralist fatigue Chow describes is simple: Subject X may 
be different in content, but shows up, time and again, the same in 
form. (We can see this in the entrance of both “trans” identity and 
“disability” into the intersectional fray.) 
 
CYBORGS AND OTHER COMPANIONATE 
ASSEMBLAGES
The literature on intersectionality has also been enhanced by 
the focus on representational politics, driven by Judith Butler’s 
Gender Trouble and also Gayatri Spivak’s Can the Subaltern 
Speak[12]. Rarely have scholars concerned with the impact and 
development of representational politics come into dialogue with 
those convinced of the non-representational referent of “matter 
itself” – Donna Haraway, Elizabeth Grosz, Elizabeth Wilson, 
Karan Barad, Patricia Clough, Dianne Currier, Vicky Kirby, 
Miriam Fraser, Luciana Parisi, to name a few. Divested from 
subject formation but for different reasons, these feminist scholars 
in science and technology studies inflected by Deleuzian thought 
have been concerned about bodily matter, claiming its liminality 
cannot be captured by intersectional subject positioning. They 
proffer instead the notion that bodies are unstable assemblages 
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that cannot be seamlessly disaggregated into identity formations. 
Elizabeth Grosz, for example, foregrounding its spatial and 
temporal essentializations, calls intersectionality “a gridlock model 
that fails to account for the mutual constitution and indeterminacy 
of embodied configurations of gender, sexuality, race, class, and 
nation.”[13] 
Donna Haraway has been the most influential of this group. 
In a leading text from this literature she famously stated, as the 
very last line in her groundbreaking 1985 essay “A Manifesto for 
Cyborgs”[14] that she would rather be a cyborg than a goddess, 
favoring the postmodern technologized figure of techno-human 
hybridity – the body as an information construct – over the 
reclamation of a racialized, matriarchal past (thus implicitly 
invoking this binary between intersectionality and assemblage). 
While several theorists have critiqued Haraway’s use of the trope 
of woman of color to signify a cyborg par excellence, including 
Chela Sandoval and Malini Joshar Schueller (who has argued that 
women of color function as a prosthetic to the cyborg myth[15], 
which as I point out earlier, is not unlike how WOC function 
in relation to intersectionality), there has yet to be a serious 
interrogation of what these theories on matter and mattering 
might bring to conceptualizations of intersectionality. Indeed 
Schuellar has argued that this focus on matter, driven by science 
and technology studies, produces and is produced by a desire to 
avoid theorizing race. This is most certainly a legitimate complaint, 
but it also bypasses the issues being raised here, namely a critique 
of linguistic performativity that presumes that everything resides 
within signification. For Haraway, even though cyborgs are meant 
to undermine binaries – of humans and animals, of humans and 
machines, and of physical and non-physical – a cyborg actually 
inhabits an intersection – of body and technology, as Vicky Kirby, 
Dianne Currier, and others have argued. Dianne Currier writes: “in 
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the construction of a cyborg, technologies are added to impact upon, 
and at some point intersect with a discrete, non-technological ‘body.’” 
“Thus, insofar as the hybrid cyborg is forged in the intermeshing of 
technology with a body, in a process of addition, it leaves largely 
intact those two categories – (human) body and technology – that 
preceded the conjunction.” “effectively reinscribing the cyborg into 
the binary logic of identity which Haraway hopes to circumvent.” 
[16]. Haraway does not actually approach a human/animal/machine 
nexus, though more recent theorizations of the nature/culture 
divide, by Luciana Parisi for example, demarcate the biophysical, 
the biocultural, and the biodigital.[17] Still, the question of how 
the body is materialized, rather than what the body signifies, is the 
dominant one in this literature. 
Assemblage is actually an awkward translation – the 
original term in Deleuze and Guattari’s work is not the French 
word assemblage, but actually Agencement, a term which means 
design, layout, organization, arrangement, and relations – the focus 
being not on content but on relations, relations of patterns. For 
Agencement, as John Phillips explains in a recent essay, specific 
*connections* with other concepts is precisely what gives concepts 
their meaning. As Phillips writes, the priority is neither to the state 
of affairs (essence) nor to statement (enunciation) but rather to 
connection.[18] The French and English definitions of assemblage 
lean more to collection, combination, assembling, and both are 
also used as a term signaling collage in avant garde art. (So one 
question which I cannot attend to but that haunts this traversal from 
French theoretical production to U.S. academic usage is, what are 
the productive effects of this “mis” translation?) 
There are thus numerous ways to define what assemblages 
are, but I am here more interested in what assemblages do. For my 
purposes, assemblages are interesting because A. They de-privilege 
the human body as a discrete organic thing. As Haraway notes, 
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the body does not end at the skin. We leave traces of our DNA 
everywhere we go, we live with other bodies within us, microbes 
and bacteria, we are enmeshed in forces, affects, energies, we are 
composites of information. B. Assemblages do not privilege bodies 
as human, nor as residing within a human/animal binary. Along 
with a de-exceptionalizing of human bodies, multiple forms of 
matter can be bodies – bodies of water, cities, institutions, and so 
on. Matter is an actor. Following Karen Barad on her theory of 
performative metaphysics, matter is not a ‘thing’ but a doing. In 
particular, Barad challenges dominant notions of performativity 
that operate through an implicit distinction between signification 
and that which is signified, stating that matter does not only 
materialize through signification alone. Writes Barad: 
“A performative understanding of discursive practices 
challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to 
represent preexisting things. Performativity, properly construed, is 
not an invitation to turn everything (including material bodies) into 
words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a contestation 
of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is 
real. Hence, in ironic contrast to the monism that takes language 
to be the stuff of reality, performativity is actually a contestation 
of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other 
forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies 
than they deserve.”[19]
Barad’s is a posthumanist framing that questions the boun-
daries between human and non-human, matter and discourse, 
and interrogates the practices through which these boundaries 
are constituted, stabilized, and destabilized. C. Signification is 
only one element of many that give a substance both meaning 
and capacity. In his latest book A New Philosophy of Society: 
Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, Manual DeLanda 
undertakes the radical move to “make language last.”[20] In 
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this post, post-structuralist framing, essentialism, which is usually 
posited as the opposite of social constructionism, is now placed 
squarely within the realms of signification and language, what 
Delanda and others have called “linguistic essentalism.” As Karen 
Barad claims, “language has been granted too much power.”[21] 
(The danger of her notion of “ontological realism” is that it may 
well privilege an essentialized truth produced through matter.) D. 
Finally, categories – race, gender, sexuality – are considered events, 
actions, and encounters, between bodies, rather than simply entities 
and attributes of subjects. Situated along a “vertical and horizontal 
axis”, assemblages come into existence within processes of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari problematize a model that produces a constant 
in order to establish its variations. Instead, they argue, assemblages 
foreground no constant but rather “variation to variation” and hence 
the event-ness of identity.[22] DeLanda thus argues that race and 
gender are situated as attributes only within a study of “the pattern 
of recurring links, as well as the properties of those links.” [23]
 
RE-READING INTERSECTIONALITY AS 
ASSEMBLAGE
One of Kimberle Crenshaw’s foundational examples – that 
of the traffic intersection – actually situates intersectionality as an 
event. As Crenshaw writes, “Consider an analogy to traffic in an 
intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, 
like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and 
it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it 
can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, 
sometimes, from all of them.” And later: “But it is not always easy to 
reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries 
simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts 
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to determine which driver caused the harm. In these cases the 
tendency seems to be that no driver is held responsible, no treatment 
is administered, and the involved parties simply get back in their 
cars and zoom away.” [24].
As Crenshaw indicates in this description, identification is 
a process; identity is an encounter, an event, an accident, in fact. 
Identities are multi-causal, multi-directional, liminal; traces aren’t 
always self-evident. In this “becoming of intersectionality,” there 
is emphasis on motion rather than gridlock; on how the halting 
of motion produces the demand to locate. The accident itself 
indicates the entry of the standardizing needs to the juridical; is 
there a crime taking place? How does one determine who is at 
fault? Intersectionality is thus a much more porous paradigm than 
the standardization of method inherent to a discipline has allowed 
it to be; the institutionalization of women’s studies in the U.S. has 
led to demands for a subject/s (subject X, in fact) and a method. 
Another of Crenshaw’s primary concerns is with the structural 
prejudices of domestic violence: unequal access to services, 
representational and re-presentational biases in the legal system. I 
want to turn now to a moment in Brian Massumi’s Parables for the 
Virtual where he reads domestic violence through the “home event-
space.”[25] For him, the event is not defined as a discrete act or 
series of actions or activities, but rather the “folding of dimensions 
of time into each other”[26]. This folding of time into and out of 
each other is a result of the “conversion of surface distance into 
intensity [which] is also the conversion of the materiality of the 
body into an event.”[27]. Interested in a purported increase in 
domestic violence during Superbowl Sunday, Massumi writes:
“The home entry of the game, at its crest of intensity, upsets 
the fragile equilibrium of the household. The patterns of relations 
between househeld bodies is reproblematized. The game event 
momentarily interrupts the pattern of extrinsic relations generally 
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obtaining between domestic types, as typed by gender. A struggle 
ensues: a gender struggle over clashing codes of sociality, rights 
to access to portions of the home and its contents, and rituals of 
servitude. The sociohistorical home place converts into an event 
space. The television suddenly stands out from the background 
of the furnishings, imposing itself as a catalytic part-subject, 
arraying domestic bodies around itself according to the differential 
potentials generally attaching to their gender type. For a moment, 
everything is up in the air – and around the TV set, and between 
the living room and the kitchen. In proximity to the TV, words and 
gestures take on unaccustomed intensity. Anything could happen. 
The male body, sensing the potential, transduces the heterogeniety 
of the elements of the situation into a reflex readiness to violence. 
The “game” is rigged by the male’s already-constituted propensity 
to strike. The typical pattern of relations is re-imposed in the 
unity of movement of hand against face. The strike expresses 
the empirical reality of situation: recontainment by the male-
dominated power formation of the domestic. The event short-
circuits. The event is recapture. The home event-space is back 
to the place it was: a container of asymmetric relations between 
terms already constituted according to gender. Folding back onto 
domestication. Coded belong, no becoming.”[28]
So what do we have here? First, an intensification of the body’s 
relation to itself (one definition of affect), produced not only by 
the significance of the game, Superbowl Sunday, but by the bodily 
force and energy given over to this significance (notice difference 
between signification and significance). Second, a focus on the 
patterns of relations – not the entities themselves, but the patterns 
within which they are arranged with each other. Not Assemblage, 
but Agencement. Third, household bodies: the television as an 
actor, an actant (Bruno Latour), as matter with force as determining 
who moves where and how and when. The television is an affective 
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conductor: “in proximity to the TV, words and gestures take on 
an unaccustomed intensity.” Fourth, “Anything could happen.” 
A becoming. A deterritorialization. Fifth, intersectional identity: 
the male is always already ideologically coded as more prone to 
violence – a closing off of becoming. Finally, the strike: the hand 
against face. Reterritorialization. 
Massumi writes: “The point of bringing up this issue is not to 
enter the debate on whether there is an empirically provable causal 
link between professional sports and violence against women. The 
outpouring of verbal aggression provoked by the mere suggestion that 
there was a link is enough to establish the theoretical point in question 
here: that what the mass media transmit is not fundamentally image-
content but event-potential.”[29] Thus this reading of Massumi’s 
is not a textual analysis of the possibility that watching violent 
television produces violence, or violent subjects. It is not a theory 
of spectatorship identification, but of affective intensification: the 
meeting of technology (good old TV, no need to always privilege the 
internet), bodies, matter, molecular movements, energetic transfers. 
Massumi insinuates that ultimately, the relationship of positionality 
to affect, feelings, and sensations is arbitrary. Thus, a politics of affect 
underscores subject positionings that are seemingly irreconcilable. 
Unlike Crenshaw, the focus here is not on whether there is a crime 
taking place, nor determining who is at fault, but rather asking what 
are the affective conditions necessary for the event-space to unfold. 
In the most basic of feminist terms, we can read Massumi’s interest in 
unraveling the script as offering a different way of thinking about the 
questions what causes domestic violence and how can we prevent it? 
 
DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL
There’s obviously much more to say about such an example; 
certainly it is true that these theorists (with the exception of Arun 
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Saldahna) have not had much to say about race. In closing, and as 
an effort to signpost the lines of flight this essay cannot fully follow 
given space restrictions, my own concerns about the limitations of 
intersectional frameworks go far beyond rethinking its contextual 
specificity (and Massad gestures to this – this is not only about 
epistemological incongruency but more importantly, ontological 
irreducibility[30]). As I have argued in Terrorist Assemblages: “No 
matter how intersectional our models of subjectivity, no matter 
how attuned to locational politics of space, place, and scale, these 
formulations – these fine tunings of intersectionality, as it were, 
that continue to be demanded – may still limit us if they presume 
the automatic primacy and singularity of the disciplinary subject 
and its identitarian interpellation.”[31] My interest in interrogating 
the predominance of subjecthood itself is driven precisely by the 
limitations of poststructuralist critique that Rey Chow foregrounds, 
the concerns about the nature/culture divide and questions of 
language and materiality that the science and technology feminists 
have outlined, the attention to power and affect that assemblage 
theorists centralize, and finally, my own relating of all of this to the 
debates on disciplinary societies and societies of control driven by 
the work of Michel Foucault and Deleuze’s extension of it. In the 
2007 English translation of Michel Foucault’s 1977-1978 lectures 
titled Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault distinguishes 
between disciplinary mechanisms, and security apparatuses, 
what Deleuze would later come to call “control societies. On the 
disciplinary organization of multiplicity, Foucault writes: 
“Discipline is a mode of individualization of multiplicities 
rather than something that constructs an edifice of multiple 
elements on the basis of individuals who are worked on as, first 
of all, individuals.”[32]
Many relations between discipline (exclusion and inclusion) 
and control (modulation, tweaking) have been proffered as a of 
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late. One, as various overlapping yet progressive stages of market 
capitalism and governmentality; two, as co-existing models and 
exercises of power; three, control as an effect of disciplinary 
apparatuses – control as the epitome of a disciplinary society par 
excellence (in that disciplinary forms of power exceed their sites 
to reproduce everywhere); and finally, as Foucault suggests above, 
disciplinary frames as a response to control. It seems to me, and 
I pose these as tentative questions and points that I am working 
through, that intersectional critique has both intervened in the 
legal and capitalist structures that demand the fixity of the rights 
bearing subject and also reproduced the disciplinary demands of 
that subject formation. As Norma Alarcon presciently asked in 
1984, in her response to the publication of This Bridge Called My 
Back[33], are we going to make a subject of the whole world? [34] 
At this productive impasse, then, is this contradiction – on the one 
hand, the heuristic of intersectionality has produced a proliferation 
of work on WOC while simultaneously excusing white feminists 
from this work, re-centering gender and sexual difference as 
foundational and primary. On the other hand, “we” might be reaching 
a poststructuralist fatigue around the notion of the subject itself. 
Therefore, to dismiss assemblage in favor of retaining 
intersectional identitarian frameworks is to miss the ways in which 
societies of control apprehend and produce bodies as information, 
as matter that functions not or predominantly through signification, 
as modulation of capacities, as dividuals in populations with 
any array of diverse switchpoints (rather than Althusserian 
interpellation per se), and surveilles bodies not on identity positions 
alone but through affective tendencies and statistical probabilities. 
But to render intersectionality as an archaic relic of identity 
politics then partakes in the fantasy of never-ending inclusion of 
capacity-endowed bodies, bypassing entirely the possibility that 
for some bodies – we can call them statistical outliers, or those 
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consigned to premature death, or those once formerly considered 
useless bodies or bodies of excess – discipline and punish may 
well still be the a primary mode of power apparatus. There are 
different conceptual problems posed by each; intersectionality 
attempts to comprehend political institutions and their attendant 
forms of social normativity and disciplinary administration, 
while assemblages, in an effort to re-introduce politics into the 
political, asks what is prior to and beyond what gets established. 
So it seems to me that one of the big payoffs for thinking through 
the intertwined relations of intersectionality and assemblages is 
that it can help us produce more roadmaps of precisely these not 
quite fully understood relations between discipline and control. 
To return to the title of my talk, and the juxtaposition that 
Haraway (unfortunately, but presciently) renders, would I really 
rather be a cyborg than a goddess? The former hails the future in 
a telelogical technological determinism – culture – that seems not 
only overdetermined but exceptionalizes our current technologies. 
The latter – nature – is embedded in the racialized matriarchal 
mythos of feminist reclamation narratives. Certainly it sounds sexier, 
these days, to lay claim to being a cyborg than a goddess. But why 
disaggregate the two when there surely must be cyborgian-goddesses 
in our midst? Now that is an becoming-intersectional assemblage 
that I could really appreciate.
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